bingo-ai 3.6.3
Key Facts
- Blind Signing / EIP-7730 (Bybit $1.5B Attack Vector) The Bybit $1.5B hack (Feb 2025) exploited a Safe multisig blind signing flaw: - Attackers changed operation parameter from0 (call) →1 (delegatecall) - Signers could not detect the change on hardware wallets - EIP-712 structured data was insufficient to prevent this bingo's web3-blind-signing-audit and web3-safe-multisig-optype skills detect these patterns: [CRITICAL] Operation Type UI Not Displayed Safe transaction operation type (0=call, 1=delegatecall) not shown in UI Fix: Display operation type explicitly in signing UI [HIGH] EIP-7730 Not Implemented Hardware wallet cannot display human-readable transaction details Fix: Submit JSON manifest to https://github.com/LedgerHQ/clear-signing-erc7730-registry Example: DApp Full Pentest (with wallet auth) # DApp that requires wallet login bingo> https://app.defi-protocol.com dapp pentest # bingo automatically: # 1.
- Android APK # In bingo chat bingo> analyze target.apk bingo> target.apk secret scan bingo> pentest com.example.app CLI / Python: trufflehog filesystem target.apk --json --no-verification # Docker (no install needed): docker run -v $(pwd):/work trufflesecurity/trufflehog:latest filesystem /work/target.apk --json Install TruffleHog: brew install trufflesecurity/trufflehog/trufflehog # macOS curl -sSfL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/trufflesecurity/trufflehog/main/scripts/install.sh | sh -s -- -b /usr/local/bin # Linux iOS IPA # In bingo chat bingo> analyze target.ipa bingo> ios swift decompile target.ipa bingo> malimite target.ipa Requires: Java 17+ and Malimite.jar brew install openjdk@17 # Download Malimite.jar from https://github.com/LaurieWired/Malimite/releases mkdir -p ~/tools && mv ~/Downloads/Malimite.jar ~/tools/ java -jar ~/tools/Malimite.jar target.ipa --output ./decompiled/ trufflehog filesystem ./decompiled/ --json --no-verification Auto-detect (APK or IPA) bingo> auto scan target.apk # AI picks the right method automatically bingo> auto scan target.ipa What bingo extracts Post-Exploitation — Webshell Deploy (v2.2.5) After confirmed SQLi, bingo runs the full post-exploit chain automatically: Chain: SQLi login bypass → file upload → webshell → AntSword connect # In bingo chat — just describe the goal bingo> I have SQLi on https://target.com/login — get admin access and deploy webshell bingo handles each step: Webshell types auto-selected: DB Dump (v2.9.6) Triggered automatically after confirmed SQLi / webshell / RCE: - Dumps: member /user /admin /g5_member /xe_member - No row limit — max_rows_per_table=0 (unlimited), entire table dumped - Saves credentials → CREDENTIALS_{table}.json - Detects hash type → prints hashcat -m {mode} command - Re-attempts admin login with extracted credentials Save location (auto-detected by OS): v2.9.6 fix: AI-generated extraction code was saving to /tmp/ and ignoring DbDumper.
- Anti-Hallucination — 4-Layer Guard Every AI response is blocked unless it passes all 4 checks: - Code block guard — rejects empty stubs, JSON plans - Text intercept — rejects AI self-confessions - Fake credential block — no credentials without HTTP proof - Unproven conclusion block — no "SQLi confirmed" without code execution Evidence labels in reports: bingo scan — Full Auto Pipeline bingo scan https://target.com Runs 5 phases automatically, no interaction needed: Report saved to: ~/.config/bingo/reports/report_<domain>.md Proxy Pool Rotation (v3.2.18) Automatically rotates IP addresses to bypass WAF bans, rate limits, and IP blocks.
- JSON output format: { "bingo_version": "3.2.99", "generated_at": "2026-06-29 20:00:00", "target": "https://target.com", "total": 3, "critical": 2, "high": 1, "confirmed": 1, "findings": [ { "id": "BINGO-0001", "vuln_type": "sqli", "severity": "HIGH", "target": "https://target.com", "payload": "' OR 1=1--", "evidence": "admin:5f4dcc3b5aa765d61d8327deb882cf99", "timestamp": 1751198400.0, "timestamp_str": "2026-06-29 20:00:00", "confirmed": false, "screenshot_path": "", "notes": "" } ] } Override output path: export BINGO_REPORTS_DIR=/custom/path # then run bingo 2.
- /proxy api https://your-own-proxy-api.com/list.txt Supported API response formats: - Plain text, one proxy per line ( ip:port orscheme://ip:port ) - JSON array: ["socks5://1.2.3.4:1080", ...] Proxy in AI-Generated Scripts When /proxy is active, every AI script automatically includes: import requests # [bingo v3.2.18: PROXY ACTIVE] PROXIES = {'http': 'socks5://1.2.3.4:1080', 'https': 'socks5://1.2.3.4:1080'} s = requests.Session() s.proxies.update(PROXIES) s.verify = False # required for Tor / self-signed certs r = s.get("https://target.com/api/...", timeout=15) Requirements pip install PySocks # SOCKS5 proxy support (auto-installed) pip install stem # Tor circuit rotation (optional) Both are included in pyproject.toml dependencies — installed automatically with bingo.
- Attack Chain /.well-known/oauth-authorization-server ↓ registration_endpoint (no auth required) ↓ Attacker registers client → gets client_id + client_secret ↓ Authorization request with attacker redirect_uri ↓ Victim clicks → authorization code sent to attacker.com ↓ Token exchange (PKCE not enforced) ↓ Wildcard CORS → cross-origin token read ↓ Account Takeover ✓ What bingo checks automatically Usage bingo skill show sec-web-oauth-open-reg bingo skill search oauth DApp / Web3 / Smart Contract Audit (v3.2.62) bingo now includes 28 dedicated DApp/Web3/Smart Contract audit skills — auto-triggered when Web3 keywords are detected.
- OAuth Open Client Registration Chain Attack (v3.2.65) bingo v3.2.65 adds sec-web-oauth-open-reg — a full attack chain for the critical OAuth misconfiguration where unauthenticated dynamic client registration enables account takeover.
- v2.9.5 raises the threshold to 25 for scan result lines and enforces deduplication in the AI-generated scan code.
- bingo> audit https://app.uniswap.org smart contract bingo> https://defi-target.com reentrancy vulnerability check bingo> analyze solidity contract for flash loan attack bingo> dapp pentest https://app.example.com # auto wallet generation + SIWE login DApp Audit Skills (28 total) Key Vulnerability Coverage DApp Authentication — Wallet Generation + SIWE Login (v3.2.62) Most DApps require a wallet connection before any API access.
- New in v3.2.84 — Hybrid Intelligence Engine (URL-triggered Whitebox Flow) Automatic Whitebox Prompt on New Target (v3.2.84) From v3.2.84, when you type a new URL target, bingo automatically asks for a source code path — no separate /whitebox command needed: ❯ https://target.com 📂 Source code path?
Blind Signing / EIP-7730 (Bybit $1.5B Attack Vector) The Bybit $1.5B hack (Feb 2025) exploited a Safe multisig blind signing flaw: - Attackers changed operation parameter from0 (call) →1 (delegatecall) - Signers could not detect the change on hardware wallets - EIP-712 structured data was insufficient to prevent this bingo’s web3-blind-signing-audit and web3-safe-multisig-optype skills detect these patterns: [CRITICAL] Operation Type UI Not Displayed Safe transaction operation type (0=call, 1=delegatecall) not shown in UI Fix: Display operation type explicitly in signing UI [HIGH] EIP-7730 Not Implemented Hardware wallet cannot display human-readable transaction details Fix: Submit JSON manifest to https://github.com/LedgerHQ/clear-signing-erc7730-registry Example: DApp Full Pentest (with wallet auth) # DApp that requires wallet login bingo> https://app.defi-protocol.com dapp pentest # bingo automatically: # 1. Android APK # In bingo chat bingo> analyze target.apk bingo> target.apk secret scan bingo> pentest com.example.app CLI / Python: trufflehog filesystem target.apk –json –no-verification # Docker (no install needed): docker run -v $(pwd):/work trufflesecurity/trufflehog:latest filesystem /work/target.apk –json Install TruffleHog: brew install trufflesecurity/trufflehog/trufflehog # macOS curl -sSfL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/trufflesecurity/trufflehog/main/scripts/install.sh | sh -s, -b /usr/local/bin # Linux iOS IPA # In bingo chat bingo> analyze target.ipa bingo> ios swift decompile target.ipa bingo> malimite target.ipa Requires: Java 17+ and Malimite.jar brew install openjdk@17 # Download Malimite.jar from https://github.com/LaurieWired/Malimite/releases mkdir -p ~/tools && mv ~/Downloads/Malimite.jar ~/tools/ java -jar ~/tools/Malimite.jar target.ipa –output ./decompiled/ trufflehog filesystem ./decompiled/ –json –no-verification Auto-detect (APK or IPA) bingo> auto scan target.apk # AI picks the right method automatically bingo> auto scan target.ipa What bingo extracts Post-Exploitation, Webshell Deploy (v2.2.5) After confirmed SQLi, bingo runs the full post-exploit chain automatically: Chain: SQLi login bypass → file upload → webshell → AntSword connect # In bingo chat, just describe the goal bingo> I have SQLi on https://target.com/login, get admin access and deploy webshell bingo handles each step: Webshell types auto-selected: DB Dump (v2.9.6) Triggered automatically after confirmed SQLi / webshell / RCE: - Dumps: member /user /admin /g5_member /xe_member - No row limit, max_rows_per_table=0 (unlimited), entire table dumped - Saves credentials → CREDENTIALS_{table}.json - Detects hash type → prints hashcat -m {mode} command - Re-attempts admin login with extracted credentials Save location (auto-detected by OS): v2.9.6 fix: AI-generated extraction code was saving to /tmp/ and ignoring DbDumper.
The Vulnerability
Anti-Hallucination, 4-Layer Guard Every AI response is blocked unless it passes all 4 checks: - Code block guard, rejects empty stubs, JSON plans - Text intercept, rejects AI self-confessions - Fake credential block, no credentials without HTTP proof - Unproven conclusion block, no “SQLi confirmed” without code execution Evidence labels in reports: bingo scan, Full Auto Pipeline bingo scan https://target.com Runs 5 phases automatically, no interaction needed: Report saved to: ~/.config/bingo/reports/report_
Further details indicate that jSON output format: { “bingo_version”: “3.2.99”, “generated_at”: “2026-06-29 20:00:00”, “target”: “https://target.com”, “total”: 3, “critical”: 2, “high”: 1, “confirmed”: 1, “findings”: [ { “id”: “BINGO-0001”, “vuln_type”: “sqli”, “severity”: “HIGH”, “target”: “https://target.com”, “payload”: “’ OR 1=1–”, “evidence”: “admin:5f4dcc3b5aa765d61d8327deb882cf99”, “timestamp”: 1751198400.0, “timestamp_str”: “2026-06-29 20:00:00”, “confirmed”: false, “screenshot_path”: “”, “notes”: “” } ] } Override output path: export BINGO_REPORTS_DIR=/custom/path # then run bingo 2.
/proxy api https://your-own-proxy-api.com/list.txt Supported API response formats: - Plain text, one proxy per line ( ip:port orscheme://ip:port ) - JSON array: [“socks5://1.2.3.4:1080”, …] Proxy in AI-Generated Scripts When /proxy is active, every AI script automatically includes: import requests # [bingo v3.2.18: PROXY ACTIVE] PROXIES = {‘http’: ‘socks5://1.2.3.4:1080’, ‘https’: ‘socks5://1.2.3.4:1080’} s = requests.Session() s.proxies.update(PROXIES) s.verify = False # required for Tor / self-signed certs r = s.get(“https://target.com/api/…”, timeout=15) Requirements pip install PySocks # SOCKS5 proxy support (auto-installed) pip install stem # Tor circuit rotation (optional) Both are included in pyproject.toml dependencies, installed automatically with bingo.
Attack Chain /.well-known/oauth-authorization-server ↓ registration_endpoint (no auth required) ↓ Attacker registers client → gets client_id + client_secret ↓ Authorization request with attacker redirect_uri ↓ Victim clicks → authorization code sent to attacker.com ↓ Token exchange (PKCE not enforced) ↓ Wildcard CORS → cross-origin token read ↓ Account Takeover ✓ What bingo checks automatically Usage bingo skill show sec-web-oauth-open-reg bingo skill search oauth DApp / Web3 / Smart Contract Audit (v3.2.62) bingo now includes 28 dedicated DApp/Web3/Smart Contract audit skills, auto-triggered when Web3 keywords are detected.
“socks5://1.2.3.4:1080”, Spokesperson
Risk & Exposure
Previous versions triggered the infinite-loop kill after 5 identical lines.
bingo> audit https://app.uniswap.org smart contract bingo> https://defi-target.com reentrancy vulnerability check bingo> analyze solidity contract for flash loan attack bingo> dapp pentest https://app.example.com # auto wallet generation + SIWE login DApp Audit Skills (28 total) Key Vulnerability Coverage DApp Authentication, Wallet Generation + SIWE Login (v3.2.62) Most DApps require a wallet connection before any API access.
Patching & Remediation
-
External tools are used as optional upgrades, not requirements.
-
OAuth Open Client Registration Chain Attack (v3.2.65) bingo v3.2.65 adds sec-web-oauth-open-reg, a full attack chain for the critical OAuth misconfiguration where unauthenticated dynamic client registration enables account takeover.
-
Specialist Agent Dispatcher (/agent ) Eight vulnerability-type agents (SQLi, XSS, SSRF, Auth, RCE, IDOR, LFI, CSRF) are now available.
-
After /whitebox the dispatcher automatically prioritizes agents matching the detected patterns.
Analysis
As AI tooling proliferates, security teams face expanding attack surfaces tied to model inference and data pipelines.
Sources
Sources & References
- GitHub - bingook/bingo: Bingo - AI-powered Red Team Terminal (DeepSeek/Claude/GPT/GLM) · GitHub. Primary github release. https://github.com/bingook/bingo
- Source referenced in coverage https://github.com/bingook/bingo.git
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