Skip to main content
Process diagram: the data breach path behind this report, with the fault at OpsAgent implant. Illustration: SecurityXP

AuditTeam's 'Forced Audit': OpsAgent 5.2.8 Implant and Leak Site Behind the 'Audit & Consulting Fee'

· 4 min read · SecurityXP

Key Facts

  • DeXpose reported on June 25, 2026 that AuditTeam claimed responsibility for an attack on a Russian organization and listed it on its Tor-based leak site.
  • Open sources first identified AuditTeam in March 2026 via dbdigest.com.
  • The OpsAgent main implant is version 5.2.8 and is described as rivaling Cobalt Strike in functionality.
  • The C2 set includes two CloudFront subdomains, IP 157.20.104[.]111, and a GitHub page; the actor deleted the legacy C2 domain from the repository on September 29, 2026.
  • Attribution markers include the unique ransom note format and "Audit & Consulting fee" terminology, the Tor-based leak site, and remediation reports.

AuditTeam entered the public record in March 2026, when open sources first identified the group via dbdigest.com. By June 25, 2026, DeXpose reported that the group had claimed responsibility for an attack on a Russian organization and listed it on its Tor-based leak site. Those two dates frame the available account: an initial identification in the spring, followed by a public claim of responsibility in the summer.

The group’s public-facing language is unusual. The phrase “Audit & Consulting fee” is part of the group’s ransom note terminology, which is described as unique to this group. The leak site is Tor-based and lists targeted organizations. The same material also points to remediation reports as part of the group’s operational philosophy, a detail that distinguishes AuditTeam from conventional ransomware groups. The phrase “forced audit” captures that presentation: an intrusion framed as an audit, with a fee attached.

What the record establishes

The record is specific about dates, terminology, and infrastructure, and it is narrower than a full campaign history. It does not provide a count of victims, a timeline of intrusions beyond the June 25 claim, or a technical narrative of initial access. What it does provide is a set of indicators tied to the OpsAgent framework and a set of attribution markers tied to AuditTeam’s public behavior.

That split matters. The indicators describe tooling. The ransom note format, the Tor-based leak site, and the remediation reports describe presentation and operating style. The assessment that AuditTeam masks ransomware as consulting rests on bringing those two layers together, not on any single artifact.

The OpsAgent 5.2.8 implant

The OpsAgent main implant is version 5.2.8. The published description says it rivals Cobalt Strike in functionality. That comparison is a functional one, not a claim that the code is derived from Cobalt Strike. It places OpsAgent in the category of a maintained framework rather than a disposable payload.

The stager layer is represented by five file hashes: d3e49dceb89a25f5da4ff0c42e996857, bd4c327ad208cb722ad25e43ea3f35fc, 5d1425ab3dad1d2de053f69529d227e1, f0d5752054f6b7af1325ea340c4326d0, and 83768e994c6bb72d0b430b98a71ec8d6. A sixth hash, 109cdc24ccd4872a3e4bf6f2d4f3c3d4, is the driver of a legitimate antivirus product; on disk it appears as kvcore.sys under both C:\Windows\Sysnative\drivers\kvcore.sys and C:\Windows\System32\drivers\kvcore.sys. The separation between stager hashes and the driver hash is important: the driver hash is described as belonging to a legitimate antivirus product, so its presence is not, by itself, evidence of OpsAgent. Context is required.

The implant writes artifacts named syscache.dat to five locations: C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\Windows\Caches\syscache.dat, C:\Users{username}\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\Caches\syscache.dat, C:\Users{username}\AppData\Local\Microsoft\CLR_v4.0\syscache.dat, {modulepath}\syscache.dat, and {TempPath}\syscache.dat. The implant also writes C:\Users\Public\kv_dbg.log. These are concrete search terms for incident responders, but they are also artifacts that can be copied or imitated. A match should be treated as a lead, not a conclusion.

Command-and-control and the GitHub page

The C2 layer includes two CloudFront CDN subdomains, d19v1tntmz2i98[.]cloudfront[.]net and d35htktbyt7nxc[.]cloudfront[.]net, and IP 157.20.104[.]111. A GitHub page at hxxps://github[.]com/RonaldCMalcolm1983/staticPage serves as additional C2. The commit history shows ongoing updates until September 29, 2026, when the actor deleted the legacy C2 domain from the repository.

That commit history is the most time-specific part of the infrastructure record. It extends the group’s observed activity beyond the June 25 claim and shows maintenance of a repository tied to C2. The deletion on September 29, 2026 is a change in the public repository, not a statement that the infrastructure stopped being used.

The “forced audit” model and its limits

The attribution case rests on three published elements: the ransom note format and its “Audit & Consulting fee” terminology, which is unique to this group; the Tor-based leak site listing targeted organizations; and remediation reports that distinguish AuditTeam from conventional ransomware groups. Those elements support the “forced audit” description. They do not, on their own, establish the full scope of the group’s operations or the identity of its operators.

The OpsAgent indicators add technical weight. A framework described as rivaling Cobalt Strike in functionality, with staged payloads, a driver component, multiple file-path artifacts, CloudFront-based C2, and a GitHub repository, is not a minimal commodity tool. The record supports treating OpsAgent as an engineered toolset. It does not support claims about the number of victims, the group’s revenue, or its links to other actors.

For defenders, the practical value is in the published details: the hashes, the file paths, the domains, the IP, and the GitHub page. The analytical value is in the framing. AuditTeam’s “forced audit” is not just a label for a leak site. It is a presentation strategy that pairs a fee with a report, and the record shows why that strategy belongs in the same assessment as the implant’s technical indicators.

Tags: AuditTeam OpsAgent threat intelligence C2 infrastructure leak site DeXpose Russian

Sources & References

S SecurityXP
SecurityXP Cybersecurity News & Analysis

SecurityXP delivers cybersecurity news, vulnerability analysis, data breach reports, and threat intelligence.

Security Digest

The most important cybersecurity stories, CVE alerts, and threat intelligence — one concise email. Unsubscribe anytime.

Related Articles

Process diagram of the ransomware attack chain: Affiliate suite through Defense disabled, with the fault at driver.
Malware & Ransomware

GentleKiller Ransomware Abuses Vulnerable Drivers to Disable 400+ EDR Security Processes

This rapid adoption distinguishes Gentlemen from most other RaaS operators, who typically wait weeks or months before adapting publicly released exploits...

Process diagram of the ransomware attack chain: SQL Server flaw through Global cascade, with the fault at Unpatched hosts.
Malware & Ransomware

Virus vs Worm: Why the Propagation Difference Actually Matters

But no detection tool replaces patching: the vulnerability that WannaCry used had a patch available for eight weeks before the attack. In 1988, the Morris...

Process diagram of the software supply chain: BYOVD Drivers through Credential Theft, with the fault at EDR Killer Tools.
Malware & Ransomware

The Gentlemen RaaS Uses GentleKiller EDR Framework Targeting 400 Security Processes

It allows The Gentlemen operators to integrate abused drivers into their toolset very soon after an EDR killer PoC is disclosed." The third-party...

Process diagram of the exploitation chain: Community feed through Report shared, with the fault at Malware found.
Malware & Ransomware

Portugal Q3 2021 Threat Report: Key Malware Stats

Segurança-Informática developed and maintains the Portuguese Abuse Open Feed 0xSI f33d, an open sharing database with the potential to collect indicators from numerous sources. This feed is provide...